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In Romania of today the largest part of available incomes at old age is ensured by pensions, 
and the most important source is constituted by the public system. 
 
 The reform of the multipillar type system – is delayed, already regulated but still partially non-
operational - is aimed to the youth of today as future or junior contributors to the system.  
 
Only young persons under 35 might plan and think about the level and structure of the 
intended old age pension. Older generations do not have a viable perspective towards 
financial independence in old age; quite on the contrary they are faced with far more limited 
options, which include: 
-  participation to the public system, but the expected pensions shall be 
comparatively far more diminished (in accordance with estimates, the transfer 
rate in the public system shall be substantially diminished); 
-  the contribution to funded private systems, but on a pretty high background of 
uncertainty – distrust against market operators, diminished possibilities of 
contribution due to low incomes, low estimated rates of profitability (for shorter 
contribution’ periods); 
-  The recourse to specific social assistance services for the third age as addition is 
more a desiderate than an alternative, Romania having a lot more to achieve in 
this sense. 
The projected system is not adequate for persons with low incomes or for the medium term 
future pensioners  
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The reform of old age insurance system is a true challenge for Romania, at least for three 
reasons: 
-  The current system, partially reformed and constructively truncated undergoes a crisis;  
- due to the speeding up of demographic transition and in the absence of a real (economic and 
social) and coherent reform, the old people of tomorrow shall not only be significantly more in 
numbers, but also poorer and more dependent on the social assistance systems of the state; 
- EU accession and free movement of labour force requires the creation of an old age security 
system compatible with the ones of the EU member states, which should stimulate insurance 
and allow for the transfer of insured amounts. 
To a certain extent, a system adequate to Romania is required, that should also answer to 
strategic exigencies of economic development and social stability within the European 
room
1. More and more is discussed about the necessity of “national pension reform strategies” 
to ensure “future evolution of social protection from a long-term point of view, giving particular 
attention to the sustainability of pensions systems in different time frameworks up to 2020 and 
beyond” (Lisbon, 2000). In this context, Romania is still in the stage of building a multipillar 
pension scheme. Reforms are still slow paced, a legal frame for a multiple system has been 
outlined and we find ourselves in the stage of preparing the implementation of private funds. 
 
1.  Pensions Reform – much too far  
from ensuring inter- and intrageneration equity 
 
Transition in the field of pensions’ system has lasted now for about 15 years, and the results 
are far too modest. The profound and prolonged economic crisis and the inability to rapidly 
adjust to the exigencies of a competitive environment, to be dynamic and flexible in achieving 
the necessary changes triggered an unjustified postponement and lack of consistency in 
social reforms.  
Right from the start it was wrongly assumed that pensions’ reform represents a secondary 
field of interest. The commitments made to generations in payment regarding old age security 
are not supported yet by a protection system oriented on the future. Even after all this time, 
the fundamental laws of old age insurance have been drawn up in a hurry (!) and, for their 
becoming operational they need to be modified. 11 years of preparation and 4 years of public 
system reform have changed the pension into a “time-bomb”, the pension system being 
unable to overcome/solve the two fundamental issues: a deficit within the affordability limit 
(now it varies between 1 and 2 % of GDP) and an inequity regarding comparable pension 
levels
2. 
Pension reform depends not only on the economy evolution, but also on policies promoted in 
the field of social assistance for persons in special circumstances, or deprived ones. Third-age 
                                                 
1 Even member states having past and present functional and performing insurance systems « are invited to set out 
clear strategies for ensuring the adequacy of their pension system without destabilising public finances or over-
burdening the economy  » (source  : Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European 
Parliament and to the Economic and Social Committee – The Future Evolution of Social Protection from a Long-
Term Point of View : Safe and Sustainable Pension, Brussels, COM(2000)622final) 
2 www.baniinostri.ro   5
individuals retired from labour market are entitled to a protection system, but the extent in 
which they might benefit from it depends not only on their individual contribution to the system, 
but also on:  
- The development degree of social protection and assistance systems for the third age; 
- The level of intergeneration transfers accepted by society, on the state contribution in 
supporting most deprived individuals; the practical efficiency of policies in the field. 
 The generation contributing nowadays should not carry a double burden (care for the own 
future in old age and transition costs) only with the hope of possible higher performances of the 
system at the moment of benefits payment. If we refer just to the contributions level: a) these 
are incapable of financing the system – the collected amounts do not cover the current 
necessities for redistribution; b) the contribution share is encumbering for economic agents 
stimulating evasion or non-participation to the system. 
Thus, the redistributive system which was predominant in past decades proves also in Romania 
as insufficient and with weaker performances as time goes by. The obtained pensions become 
more and more expensive for contributors, who bear higher and insufficient taxation and also 
more and more diminished comparatively to minimal  necessities of (today and future) 
beneficiaries. 
As result, in today’s society pensioners are a deprived category of population, bearing fully 
(by the size of redistributive pension) the weak economic performance and the errors of social 
reforms. Additionally, they bear the inequities determined by the mistakes and/or abuses of law-
makers and managers of the PAYG system, two persons with same training and “history” of 
participation to the system benefiting of different pensions just because they entered into 
payment in different periods! 
The working age active generation, potential contributors to the PAYG system, due to the 
unattractiveness and restrictions of the system participates only to a small extent. From about 10 
millions of active persons, only less than a half (employees) are compelled to participate to the 
system and other categories that might get insured but without being compelled are less 
numerous. The number of pensioners exceeds the one of employees, so that the effort of present 
generations to support persons benefiting from pensions increases gradually (Graph 1). 
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Private funded pension  appear as a balance/completion outlet between necessities and 
benefits in old age, the individual decision of participating to the system (how much and how 
long) playing a significant role. In Romania, participation depends on a sum of factors (the yet 
non-functional state of the system, distrust in the performances and, especially, income 
insufficiency, etc.) which is unviable on short-term, even in some cases impossible to achieve 
on medium-term. Not only coherent legal and institutional framework and political resolve are 
required, but most and foremost a sufficiently developed and stable financial market that should 
allow to system operators a proper, coherent and performing management of the funds. 
Turnaround solutions for the pension system exist, but a real consensus has not been reached 
between generations regarding the apportioning of transition costs and there are more and more 
constraints (budget balance, inflation target, assimilation of acquis communautaire, etc.). 
 
 
2. Brief History of Old Age Insurances 
 
Although with old traditions in enforcing some public and private social insurance systems, 
including for old age, Romania is characterised by weak efficiency in the field, inadequate 
management, which has proven counterproductive on medium- and long-term. The evolution 
of the old age insurance system after 1990 is confusing and expectations related to reform 
measures are over evaluated. Although important steps were undertaken at legal and 
institutional level, the system management is lacking (implementation, functionality and 
coherence), with weak performance, generating several sustainable inequities. 
 
2.1. Stages, particularities 
Romania is among the first states that, at the beginning of the 20
th century, disposed of an old 
age insurance system regarded as modern in those times. The Nenitescu Act from 1912 
provided a compulsory insurance system
3 for old age for the employees of corporations in the 
Old Kingdom. The insurance system is unified as of 1933 by the Ioanitescu Act
4, but until 1938 
the old age pension is excluded from the system. The reintroduction of the pensions in the 
system was partially, old age insurances for farmers being not included. Nevertheless, experts 
consider that the urban active population in Romania of the 4
th decade of the 20
th century was 
covered by social insurances too a high degree (L. Margineanu, C. Zamfir, 1999). 
The communist regime (Act 10/1949) does practically away with the private pension system, 
the public funds, as well as the private ones being included in the state budget which assures 
the social protection for employees until 1989 under the form of pensions (for old age, 
invalidity, successors)
5  and of some benefits (sickness, death, maternity). It was based 
exclusively on the PAYG system, benefits exceeding contributions. The system was 
periodically amended, improved and modernized (Annex 1): 
                                                 
3 By 1912 on the present Romanian territory were operational 3 insurance laws: one Hungarian for Transylvania 
one Austrian for Bucovina and the Nenitescu Act in the Old Kingdom. The Nenitescu Act which introduced for the 
first time the principle of compulsiveness includes also insurances for sickness, maternity, accidents and invalidity 
for the employees of corporations.  
4The unification of the system and its management takeover by the state and employers in 1933 is accompanied by 
non-inclusion of old age pension and of unemployment benefit (I. Marginean, C. Zamfir, 1999). 
5 Because it was considered that the communist regime can and ensures the full employment, unemployment 
benefits and social assistance allowances weren’t acknowledged.   7
-  from 1954 the anticipated pension was introduced, and for hazardous labour groups 
additional advantages were provided; 
-  the contributors’ sphere was widened in 1959 with agricultural workers and 
homemakers and/or household staff, aside the system remained workers from 
agricultural production cooperatives (APC), those from non-cooperativised areas and 
small handcrafters;  
-  From 1959 the employment’s compulsiveness and of employer’s contribution to the 
common insurance fund are instituted. Thereby a higher collection rate of 
contributions was ensured. 
-  even though the employment rate was high, and the population on increase, gradually 
the system enters into deficit; between 1968 and 1972 the rebalancing of the fund was 
made by diminishing the pension quota (Tufan, 1997); 
-  After 1977 and up to 1989 the system operated without substantial alterations. The 
largest part of the population was covered by the old age insurance system but a series 
of inequities were maintained and sharpened: 
•  the complete contribution stage extended with 5 years, gradually contributions 
increased; benefits remained more advantageous for employees as against other 
categories of contributors; 
•  differentiated calculation of pensions for employees and farmers - the APC 
members and non-cooperativised farmers were included in the system, but for 
these the retirement age was higher and the length of service years were 
calculated depending on labour days and not based on the employment period; 
received benefits were more reduced; 
•  different conditions for accessing pension – age, advantages for employees 
included in heavy labour categories (obtained reductions of up to 12 years of the 
pensioning limit) 
•  The equity principle of intergeneration transfers was ignored whenever 
temporary corrections were necessary for balancing the fund. For instance, same 
activity depending on the period in which it was delivered was 
included/excluded in different labour categories (normal, heavy and very heavy). 
In 1989 just a small part of the activities regarded before as being heavy were 
included in special labour groups. 
•  Independent insurance systems appear for handcraft cooperatives, Church, 
lawyers, artistic creation unions and for those employed in the public order and 
national defence system. 
 
2.2. 1990-2001(April) Reform or just adjustments? 
In the period 1990 – 1 April 2001 the pension system operated in PAYG regime, being 
subjected to 2 types of measures: on one hand a sum of actions for “righting the inequities 
promoted by the communist system”, and on the other, some initiatives of “preparing” the 
pension reforms implementation.  
Within the first group of changes were included:  
•  reassessment of the heavy and very heavy labour categories, but to exaggerated 
wide proportions;   8
•  promoting anticipated pensioning (with up to 5 years) associated with favouring 
political clientele by temporary derogatory measures from the existing algorithm 
of pensioning (especially in the period 1995-2001, March); 
•  granting very easily invalidity pensions of 3
rd degree, associated with generous 
benefits (a large part of these pensioners worked thereafter in the informal 
economy) 
•  Repeated change of the pension calculation methodology (in favour of the future 
beneficiary) and maintenance of high transfer rates, 54 – 85% from the basic 
wage. 
The second reform preparation represented, in fact, an awkward attempt to adapt the social 
security system in assembly to the new economic and social conditions. In the field of 
pensions, it intended, firstly, to set up a PAYG pillar to ensure old age protection and to 
maintain the system in financial balance
6. The main corrections were: 
-  increasing the employer contribution from 14% in 1989 applied to the wage bill and the 
employee contribution from 3% of wage rate to 22.33%, respectively 11,67% in 2000 
-  covering the deficit by transfers from the state budget (only until 1994 the fund has 
surpluses; the extremely generous replacement rate determined deficits on increase); 
-  separate administration of the pension fund for some categories of contributors (lawyers, 
military); 
-  Continuing activity after retirement is allowed by cumulating the pension with the wage 
for a period of up to three years. 
All these led to inter- and intrageneration inequities, which altered the practical relevance of the 
social solidarity principle: 
•  The connection between the contribution proportions (in share and duration) and the 
benefits’ size was profoundly distorted. There were even situations where the pension 
share exceeds not only the level of the last received wage, but it is even 20 times higher than 
the average pension at national level (!). 
•  Differentiated indexation leads to a more marked levelling of pensions, increasing not 
only poverty among old persons, but also inequity, professional and educational differences 
as results from the pension level being diminished, vanishing or even reversed (e.g. a low 
skilled worker receives as payment a higher pension than an university professor); 
•  Compulsory contribution remains only declarative, while cashing performance decreases 
due to exemptions and instalments for large debtors (they also produce the most anticipated 
pensioners) and to fiscal evasion. The informal sector of economy is stimulated also 
because of management inefficiency in the social insurance system overall. 
If we would realise a picture of the system in 2000, then this is defined by the following 
parameters: 
•  the retirement age is the one of 1989 (60/62 men, 55/57 women), with 
reductions for privileged occupational groups up to 12 years; anticipated 
retirement may be done with up to 5 years earlier; 
•  the complete contribution stage – 30 years men and 25 women (the same as in 
1977); the minimum stage 10 and 15 years; the low level of effective retirement 
                                                 
6  The extremely generous replacement rate practiced during the communist regime has created long-lasting 
imbalances within the system that are felt even today.   9
age and the increased life expectation have extended the period of benefits 
payment to about 20 years; 
•  the pension contribution is tax deductible, the employee paying 1/3 and the 
employer 2/3 and represents in average 37% of the income; the state covers 
from the state budget the fund deficits; 
•  the  contribution  collection rate is around 75% and the contribution is 
calculated for tax declared wages and not for effectively cashed incomes which 
are much higher  
•  the low participation rate to the system of active population – under 50%; 
self employed do not contribute, neither employees with civil contracts; farmers 
participate voluntary and with a low share (7%), and the economic agents from 
agriculture, food industry and trade with agricultural products/foodstuff pay a 
contribution of 2 to 4%; 
As regards benefits, the average pension in 2000 represented 43.9% comparatively to the one 
of 1990 (the actual net wage earning was of 58.6%. Pensioners amounted to almost 4.4 millions, 
employers 4.6 millions and the active population 11.6 millions). 
 
3. Reform of the pension system 
 
As in other transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the pension reform in 
Romania was based on the World Bank multipillars model. The redistributive PAYG system 
was combined with funded contributions managed in public and/or private system. 
A series of support measures were complementary considered, to ensure on one hand the 
compatibility of the systems of these countries with the ones of developed countries, and on the 
other to ensure the “constructive support frame” for the system on long term, respectively: 
increasing the retirement age (with 5 years), extending the full contribution period (with 5 
years), earned-related benefits (up to a maximum ceiling of 5 average gross wages on economy), 
diminished replacement rates in PAYG system that can be completed by compulsory and/or 
voluntary participation to occupational and/or private funded schemes. 
 
3.1. Overall scheme. Constructive principles and particularities 
Discussions regarding the construction of the general scheme were long and full of 
controversies (about stages, types of pensions/funds and impact on contributors/beneficiaries, 
present and future ones). After a decade of preparation/delay, the pension system reform started 
with the reconstruction of the 1
st compulsory pension pillar, managed by the state in the PAYG 
system.  The introduction of private pension was delayed for 4 years, period in which the first 
pillar was applied only for persons entering into payment after 1
st April 2001. Pensioners in 
payment on the date of enforcing Act 19, received a repeatedly adjusted pension but not 
comparable with the one of new pensioners. As general observation, the complementary 
measures of enforcing Act 19 could not attenuate the effects of postponing the 
introduction of private pensions and could not solve the problems of the state system on 
the contrary, it sharpened them. 
In 2001, by enforcing Act 19, the public pension system was undergoing a crisis and it was 
believed that the solution was represented by the system reconstruction. But the truncated 
enforcement of the Act and the postponement of the other stages of reform determined the 
deepening and sharpening of the crisis.   10
The year 2004 represented a crucial moment in pension policy because: on one hand a 
consensus was reached between the interested parties regarding the shape of the private funded 
pillars and specific laws were passed, and on the other hand the need was acknowledged of 
restoring the balances of the 1
st pillar and, first of all, of respecting the equity in calculating all 
pensions. 
It should be mentioned that, simultaneously to the activity targeted on creating a multipillar 
scheme of pension, there existed a gradually developed life insurance system of the private 
pension’s type to which participate currently those persons who already understood the 
advantages, perspectives and viability of the systems based on capitalisation. 
The current old age insurance system as designed by the legal and institutional framework is 
approved (Scheme 1) and bears, naturally, the fingerprint of national particularities and of the 
moment in which it was built. It is almost impossible to design very clear models, the decisions 
depending to a large extent on the specifics of each country. Still no country is absolutely free 
to choose a certain system or strategy, the decision factors having to take into account the 
current situation of the respective country (Barr, 2002). 
This old age pension scheme ensures a coherence of the contribution system and a relative 
flexibility of individual decisions in choosing the benefit “portfolio” for old age. (Annex 2) 
The four normative acts govern systems able to operate independently. It should be mentioned 
that the current public system, of a distributive type, due to population ageing and to low 
occupation, without the pension funds system with capitalisation cannot offer decent pensions.  
Pension in the new system is considered an employee’s right and not a duty. An employee may 
remain active for an unlimited period, after fulfilling the retirement age, with employer 
approval. 
The advantages of the designed system, comparatively to the possibilities of pension insurance 
in 2000 were mainly as follows: 
•  the area of potential contributors to the system increases, future pensioners 
being able to forecast to a larger extent the level of the total pension or benefits 
(fixed amounts, time-limited annuities, life annuities) on the retirement age; 
•  The calculation algorithm of state pension allows for a direct connection 
between the contribution history and benefits by means of the average individual 
score. 
•  the mix insurance allows for building up the components of total pension 
depending on the particularities of the situation for each individual – age, 
professional level and performances, the amount of total incomes, etc.; 
•  there is the possibility of additional insurance by means of pillar 1 (up to the 
limit of 5 average wages), eliminating thus the risks in the activity of market 
operators (at least until the consolidation of the old age insurance market); 
•  A greater transparency of the system is assured, especially due to its private 
component, the members of the private funds or the participants to occupational 
schemes being able to follow the activity of the operators.   11
Scheme 1                    Overall scheme of the applied pension system 
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As already stipulated earlier, some characteristics of the pension system are determined by the 
particular circumstances from Romania, i.e.: 
-  Occupational pensions have a narrower sphere of application and they are optional. 
The participation to an occupational scheme is negotiated with the employer. The 
employment of one person or gaining trade union membership cannot be conditioned by 
the participation to an occupational scheme. 
-  Private funds are initially constituted by the transfer of a part from the 
contributions to the public fund (2% as of January 2008), after which the contribution 
is increased gradually up to 6% and it is compulsory only for the newly entered 
persons into the system (under 35 years). The transfer to private funds is estimated to 
24 millions Euros in the first year of application. The switch to a private pension system, 
next to the improvement of collection in the public system by including the workers 
from abroad, prohibition of instalments and enforcement of bad debtors represent the 
most probable measures that might avoid pension system bankruptcy according to its 
current build
7. 
-  It was aimed to direct funds’ investments to prudential portfolios. By law there are 
provided investment types - in general, those transactioned or quoted on supervised 
markets and which are stipulated in the Supervision Commission Norms. By this 
selection, investment risks are limited and a more proper estimation can be made 
about expected incomes. 
Organisation and functioning of the pillars is based on a sum of common principles (Annex 3) 
that have in view the equality in treatment and the solidarity – in the participation as 
shareholder/contributor/beneficiary, and information about efficiency. 
The amounts originating from contributions to the private funds are invested with the purpose 
of maximising incomes and in the exclusive interest of the beneficiaries, in compliance with the 
following principles: 
- Prudential management and insuring the assets safety 
-diversification of investments and risk management; investments quality and 
profitability 
- maintaining an adequate level of solvency and liquidity 
By means of the new system it was aimed to create opportunities of obtaining higher total 
pensions through participation to several pillars. The risk is diversified and prudential 
investment restrictions of the capitals ensure an increased predictability of the total 
pension quota. 
 
3.2. Inconsistency and subjectivism in implementation. Pensions levelling 
At declarative level, a swift and full implementation of the system was intended, initially even 
with several pillars at the same time. In fact, even nowadays the system is not entirely 
functional. The law of the public pension system waited in Parliament to be discussed and 
approved from September 1998 to September 1999, and thereafter yet two other months to 
obtain the endorsement of the Constitutional Court (for some of the provisions). In its turn, the 
regulation regarding universal pension funds
8  was withdrawn for adjustments/improvements 
few days after its approval by the Government (after 3 years of work for improvements, the law 
                                                 
7 Source: Revista Capital, 19 August 2004. 
8 For more details, see Gh Zaman, V Vasile (2001) –Intergenerational problems in Romania with a special view on 
pension system reform, Discussion Paper no.20/2001, IER, Hitotsubashi University, Japan   13
was given up altogether). Practically, the reform started just with the implementation of pillar I 
(a year after approval). Finally, after prolonged discussions with trade unions, it was agreed on 
the idea of introducing occupational pension schemes, completed with private funds, regulated 
by specific laws in 2004. 
Indeed, the reform of the system in its assembly either is delayed as against the initial 
programme, or, and this is far more important, is unduly postponed comparatively to the 
practical needs of present and future pensioners. Even in conditions of focusing practical 
efforts just on the reform of public pensions, the adjustment of system lacks was 
postponed/corrected repeatedly and substituted rather with conjectural alterations instead of 
conception or development ones (recorrelation instead of recalculation, for instance). Moreover, 
after 4 years since the first attempt of introducing private pensions, the conditions are not 
given for their implementation. The population is poorly informed, existing market operators 
are not attracted to the proposed system argumenting that it lacks incentives and is inefficient. 
 
Box 1   The insurers criticize the private pension acts – main issues: number of participants and lack of 
functionality 
The main issue refers to the limited number of participants 
-  For occupational schemes the insurers appreciate that under the conditions in which only employees have the 
right to contribute (not also self employed) and only those from companies without debts to the state budgets, 
the market potential is very low, respectively 450 thousands contributors in the first year; 
-  For private funds, limiting the compulsiveness of participation determines the entering into the system of 
about 100 thousands individuals per year. 
Large companies consider that approved acts determine non-functioning systems, because: 
-  The number of contributors and the maximum level of provisions are limited, so that administrative 
costs cannot be covered 
-  Proposed contributions are diminished and inconsistent, stimulating pensions for participation cannot 
be accumulated 
-  A level is created on the insurance market for small and unstable companies, which could generate in 
the future lack of credibility for private pension funds 
Source: Simulation of private pensions; www.9am.ro 
 
Additionally, the economic climate does not prove itself as “favourable” to sustained efforts for 
pensions’ reform (a recent example: on request of IMF, in order to rebalance the general budget 
after introducing the flat tax rate of 16%, the entering into pay of recalculated pensions shall be 
done only partially, that is in 2005 for about 1.5 million persons). 
 
3.2.1. Recorrelation 
If for the new pensioners the enforcement of Act 19/2000 meant their participation to a 
reformed system, for the persons already in the system it meant only a sharpening of inequities. 
For the first time it was provided that the recalculation of pensions should be realised in May – 
December 2000 and to include persons pensioned until 1997
9. Although it was considered at the 
respective date that pension increases should not be very significant, it was aimed that pensions 
become equal “for equal positions and equal periods of contribution”. Practically, a review of 
the dossiers was not realised by applying the same calculation formulae as for the new 
pensioners, but an adjustment of the score depending on the year of retirement. This 
process was changed thus into recorrelation. Recorrelation did not represent a novelty, this 
                                                 
9 Those pensioned after 1997 did not enter into recalculation because their pensions were higher than the net wage 
they had before retirement (Source: Smaranda Dobrescu, Labor and Social Protection Minister at the time 
http://adevărul.kappa.ro/eco418-03.html)   14
technique of re-establishing some balances between the pensions’ level being applied also in 
1995 (GO/848)
 10. 
In 2001, after a month since the enforcement of state social insurance pensions’ act, the 
procedure of pensions’ recorrelation is instituted, that consists in increasing pensions by 
differentiated per cents, depending on the pension category on the recorrelation date and 
on the year of enrolment for pension. It was foreseen that the process shall be realised in 6 
stages until October including only pensions that exceeded the value of an average gross wage 
on economy and that entered into pay before 1998. Higher raises (of up to 53%) were provided 
for the older pensioners that fulfilled the conditions of full stage of contribution and age limit. 
In the period 2002-2004 the pensions for age limit with complete length of service entered into 
pay until 1 January 1999 were subjected to some additional measures of semesterial 
recorrelation. It was applied for persons having a corrected average annual score smaller than 
the minimum ceiling approved for participation to the system (3 points). For each stage of 
recorrelation was determined an additional number of points differentiated after the year of 
enrolment for pension, which was added for pensioners scores in the same category of 
pension, enlisted in the same year. As reference element in calculation was taken into account 
the estimated average score for a person retired on April 1
st 2001, e.g. one for whom the 
provisions of Act 19 were applicable. In this manner it was aimed to bring the level of pensions 
in payment before 2001 nearer to the one following April 1, under comparable conditions of 
contribution history, all calculations being made at average level. 
From the additional recorrelation benefited also farmer pensioners, but the granted extra score 
was somewhat more reduced. 
The total number of points granted in the two years of supplementary recorrelation was 
of up to 0.3 points, again the most senior pensioners receiving the highest score increases. 
The quantum of recorrelated pensions was determined by multiplying the adjusted score with 
the value of a point of pension set out annually by the budget of state social insurance. 
The entire process of recorrelation represented an increase of the smallest pensions 
towards the average level, the final purpose being to ensure supplementary social protection by 
means of the pensions’ level for the most poor and senior pensioners. 
Pension increases were not significant. For instance, a pensioner in pay from 1968, or before, 
benefited due to recorrelation of a pension increase of 48.38% in May 2000 (but not more than 
the average pension at the respective moment), to which was added in the period 2002 – 2004 
an increase of maximum 0.3 points (about 2/3 from the value of the previously granted raise). 
The obtained effects did not justify the administrative costs involved because this action did 
not solve the issue of reinstating some sort of balances but aggravated imbalances, the 
fundamental solution being just postponed. 
 
3.2.2. Differentiated indexation 
Parallel to the recorrelation, in order to protect the buying power of the pensions, a periodical 
(quarterly) system of indexation was applied. In the 14 stages of indexation undertaken since 
the enforcement of Act 19 and up to the end of 2004, the nominal pension increased with more 
than 2/3, the per cents varying between 7% in December 2001 and 2% in March and June 2004. 
The pressures exercised to maintain the state pension at a satisfactory level that could 
                                                 
10  An equivalent quantum with the individual pension from 31 October 1990 was determined, which was 
multiplied with the index 88 that expressed the increase of the average state social insurance pension in the period 
Nov. 1990 – Sept. 1996. If the pension calculated accordingly was smaller than the one in payment, the latter was 
maintained.   15
attenuate/annul the effects of inflation were rendered practical in the differentiated indexation, 
the most reduced increasing swifter. 
The indexation targeted the increase of the pension’s point value and of this measure benefited 
just persons with a pension smaller/equal to the value equivalent of the maximum approved 
score. Pensions exceeding this ceiling were indexed with 1 – 2%/stage. These indexations were 
under the IPC level, thus the purchasing power was gradually diminished, more marked for 
those with higher pensions. 
Also in this way the concentration process of the pensioners at the basis of the distribution 
scale on pensions' levels was weighty. Very low and small pensions tend to become equal, 
without any consideration for the personal contribution effort. 
 
3.2.3. Minimum economic effects, major social implications 
The two processes developed in parallel (recalculation and indexation) have created confusion 
and dissatisfaction among the beneficiaries. They had as social aim the 
attenuation/diminishment of poverty for this population category by supporting a more 
significant increase of smaller pensions. But, the indexations covered only partially the real 
inflation rate, and the recalculations did not trigger significant pension increases (Annex 4). The 
final result was of concentrating more and more pensioners in two areas: 
-  The one of smaller pensions than the average level achieved by “raising the base”. It 
was mainly the result of recorrelation; 
-  Near the inferior limit of the maximum contribution ceiling (3, respectively 5 pension 
points * value of the point) but it is a still rarefied area as compared with the 
aforementioned one. 
The financial effort, not at all negligible, has unbalanced even more the system, but without 
solving the issues for which it was initiated. The pensioners continued to get poorer, over 50% 
from the persons in a pensioner household have incomes placed in the first 5 deciles, 
respectively under the national minimum gross wage
11 (Annex 5) inducing problems also in 
other social sub-systems: 
–  health care, due to insufficient funds for medical assistance; 
–  Many persons asked more frequently for social assistance services. At present a 
significant part of pensioners cannot pay from pension even the household maintaining 
services during winter; 
–  More marked isolation, social exclusion, the emergence of psychical problems, etc. 
If in 2000 the incomes from social protection provision represented 38.2% from total monetary 
incomes of pensioner households, in 2002 these increase to 42.3%. Their plentiness may be 
judged by means of associating incomes from pensions with the ones from wages the weight of 
which also increases from 11.6% to 18.1%. 
Discontent has increased and many pensioners have become dependent on the younger family 
members. Only few of them, in order to add to their incomes re-entered the labour market, 
preponderantly the parallel one. Why not in the real economy? a) The wage revenues is 
associated with all social contribution burden and the employers were not ready to pay it – the 
fiscal burden of the employer in 2004 was of minimum 37.3%  from the gross wage, and the 
one of the employee 28.9%; b) immediate cash incomes are preferred instead of other, future 
                                                 
11  In the first quarter of 2002, the gross minimum wage was of 1.400.000 ROL/month, and the minimum 
consumption cost per person was of 1.632.770 ROL (87.5% covering degree).   16
advantages (after each additionally worked year, the pension could be recalculated, meaning an 
increase, but the amount was a lot smaller comparatively to amounts cashed “in hand” as result 
of delivered work). Next to it, the dynamics of economic restructuring and the growing degree 
of employer’s adjustment to the exigencies of a competitive market (product quality and 
economic efficiency) restrict the re-insertion and/or remaining on the labour market for a 
longer period of third-age individuals if these cannot update their knowledge and/or 
maintain the individual performance in their work. CVT costs and support programmes on 
labour market of elderly employees (promoted by NAE) are few and with weak efficiency. 
As a rule, the persons over 50 years who did not benefit of high professional training or a good 
labour performance become long-term unemployed or low paid employees. Many chose early 
retirement if they fulfilled the conditions, even if they received a partial anticipated pension. 
The chances of a pensioner to return in advantageous conditions on the (real) labour market are 
limited and therefore formulas are preferred of the type pension + incomes from the parallel 
market. This solution has severe implications at economic level, in the business environment 
the “games” being distorted by the (significant) activity of the parallel market, with all 
complementary implications. In family, pensioners, and especially the older ones turn into a 
real burden mainly for the households with small, under average, incomes. 
 
3.3 Chronic system crisis. Perenity of inequities 
Reforms should result in sustainable solutions to the long term problems and not just in 
stop-gap responses to imminent problems (COM (2000) 622 final). 
More and more profound inequities, incomes from pensions much smaller comparatively to the 
necessities for decent living have triggered/forced essential/fundamental decisions, such as of 
the type pension recalculation and continuing the reform with private funded pensions. 
 
3.3.1  Some basic  “correction/adjustment” measures of the pillar I 
After 4 years of trying to avoid pension recalculation by means of partial adjustment measures 
(recorrelations), finally this process has been started up in October 2004. It was agreed that 
recalculation should be realised based on the algorithm provided in Act 19 in order to determine 
the average score for all those present within the system. It is a new attempt to implement/apply 
the principle of equity in setting out the pensions within the whole state pension system -“under 
equal conditions of pensioning, equal pensions, irrespective of the retirement year”. So, by the 
end all pensioners should know their score/number of points that shall be maintained for the 
entire period of paying the pension. It shall be annually evaluated and changed into pension 
based on the corresponding value of the pension point as provided by the Act of the state social 
insurance budget. 
The quantum of the pension resulted from calculation will not be applied this time, either. This 
shall be compared to the level of the pension in pay and as pension shall be granted the highest 
quantum. If the pension in pay exceeds the pension in calculation, then the one in pay from 
which the pensioner benefits shall remain in pay and unaltered until the date at which, by 
applying the calculation formula provided by Act 19/2000 a quantum of the pension shall be 
obtained which is higher than the one above. By the GEO/3.02.2005 it was aimed to speed up 
the process - shall be finalised in 2005, but the increased pension shall enter into pay (where 
necessary) in instalments until 2006. 
From this measure will benefit 4.2 million persons retired before 2001, the first beneficiaries 
being the oldest in the system. 
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2001 (April) - 2004
 
(*) against the number of pensioners in November 2004* = 6.050.097 
Source: CNPASS data 
From  this recalculation will benefit about 70% of all pensioners in pay, but only a part of them 
shall receive increased pensions, after the first estimates, about a half
12. The recalculated rights 
shall enter into pay as of March 2005. So, in a first stage, the oldest pensioners of the system 
(214.000 persons), shall receive increased pensions depending on their individual situation 
(pensioning dossier). After recent estimates, the system will have a 12-17% overall increase of 
the funds, with different sums per pensioner, the possible increases being even of several 
millions Lei/month. 
The estimated effort of the social insurance budget shall be for 2005 of 7054 billions Lei, the 
additional expenditures of administration and logistic services being yet other 500 billions Lei. 
The recalculation, a measure that was somewhat necessary, implies in reality a lot of higher 
costs if we consider also the losses resulting from the inefficiency of alternative measures from 
the postponement period. It might also be argued that the financial effort of now as well is 
somewhat smaller precisely due to former recorrelations, but if we compute the total 
administrative costs we find an inefficient management of budget’s resources. 
 
3.3.2. Perenity of system’s inequities. A vicious circle 
Recalculation, per assembly, does not  solve the coherence issues of the system and of 
promoting intra- and intergeneration equity in the redistributive system, at least for the 
following reasons: 
•  The extent to which it is applied only by increase – pensioners who from 
recalculation have obtained a more diminished pension than the one in pay shall 
remain with the pension (in pay) frozen until the system is raised to this level. It 
results that for a certain period they shall maintain the advantage. 
•  Those who have obtained higher pensions, mainly unduly, but legally 
determined at the respective moment remain the system’s favourites (for a 
limited period or during the entire life
13). 
                                                 
12 CNPASS has announced that from the 285.000 dossiers already analysed from the beginning of October 2004, in  
55% of these the score obtained was higher than the one in pay, the pension increase being comprised between 
1.750 and 3.962.600 Lei. Only for 6.5% of the evaluated dossiers additional documents were necessary (labour 
cards, certificates with bonuses, etc.). The first dossier entered into recalculation was the one of Elena Mungoci, 
from Arges, aged 109 years. As result of analysing the dossier, the old woman received additionally almost 
342.000 Lei (less than 10 Euros/month). 
13 At present, within the system there are about 20 persons with pensions around 100 millions Lei/month (2700 – 
3000 Euros/month). For these, the pension level shall remain frozen probably for the entire period of its payment.   18
•  The recorrelation effects are eliminated but the inequities regarding the wages 
policy promoted during the communist period and in the first 10 years after 
1990 return into actuality. The history of individual contribution depends on the 
wage level and the contribution period, and not the occupation and the 
professional training level (for instance an electrician might benefit of a higher 
pension than a physician, a turner than an university professor, etc.). Moreover, 
the dispersion of salary incomes and of other benefits within the same 
professional category, without precedent especially after 1990, continues to 
increase/expand. 
•  Differences and implicitly inequities are maintained between pensions in pay of 
persons who worked in sectors that have their own pension system within the 
state system (military, magistrates, etc.) as against to those from the system 
regulated by act 19/2000
14. 
•  If we take into account the construction of the PAYG system, under its current 
form, the new pensioners shall receive pensions including inequities determined 
by the computation methodology itself of determining the pension level – either 
the value of the pension point, or the contribution history which is limited. 
•  The weak efficiency of the system induces the adjustment behaviour on short-
term.  The presence of pensioners on the parallel market for supplementary 
incomes will increase. 
Out of this financial and human effort the gain is more at the image level for the reform, and 
much less of a practical nature. In addition, all pensioners in 2005 shall be affected by a new 
decrease of pensions’ purchasing power. The 2005 value of the pension point has included also 
the effects of the expected inflation. But the implementation of the flat tax rate, for instance, 
generated a chain of price increases in other fields (recommended by IMF during the meeting 
from Bucharest in February). But, the last estimated prices increase for household services shall 
exceed total prognosed inflation for this year of 7%. 
 











































































Source: based on NIS data 
 
 
                                                 
14 Recalculation of state military pensions is regulated by Act 164/2001, Act 479/2003, GD 69/2004 and is applied 
to military staff of public institutions of national defence, public order and national safety, as well as to the civil 
staff from these institutions (from the professional viewpoint they might be compared to the one of the other 
industries).   19
4. A sustainable pension system, or just a new challenge?  
Expectations vs. practical possibilities 
 
4. 1. Access to the state pension system of young generation 
The studies performed by experts underlined that “Romanian employees shall work more for 
lesser pensions”
 15. 
The system of compulsory pensions, applicable to persons who are currently under 35 years is 
subjected to the following constraints: 
-   Financing sources of pillar I are getting cut short, the narrowing of the labour market and  
also of the contributors´ number inducing additional fiscal burdens and the danger of recording 
repeated, higher and higher fund deficits. Paradoxically, in Romania employment falls down, 
the number of employees’ decreases, but in parallel a constant unemployment rate reduction is 
registered (7.8% in Dec2003, 6.8% in Dec2004). Thus, the number of contributors compelled to 
participate to the system is diminished and the voluntary insurance compensate but partially this 
“deficit”. 
- even though participation to private funds shall be compulsory for the young labour force, no 
significant sums are transferred for this fund from pillar I, next to the fact that the PAYG 
system shall become deeply financially imbalanced. A monthly contribution of about 8% for an 
average low wage (about 300 Euros/month) even if obtaining a high efficiency of the fund, it 
cannot assure any decent “comfort” by far for the future pensioners. 
- In accordance with Act 19/2000, a young individual of 35 years shall have to work 5 years 
more than his parents and shall receive a comparatively lower pension. 
Facultative funded pension, even recognized as necessary is far less probable to develop 
significantly in the next period. Main reasons are: 
-  The system of occupational schemes  does not seem attractive. Additionally, the 200 
Euros/year deduction from personal incomes taxation for participating to the system could not 
be consider as an incentive because it assures a very small (completion) pension (a simple 
calculation shows us that under the conditions of a contribution within the limits of deductible 
sums until the fulfilment of the legal retirement age, the obtained additional pension is of 80 
Euros/month for a person up to 35 years, 35 Euros/month for a person up to 45 years and of 
about 11 Euros if the age of entering into the occupational scheme is of 55 years). If we 
consider a decent additional pension of approximately 400 Euros per year, a beneficiary of 35 
years should contribute about 800 Euros/year for 30 years, one of 45 years with 1800 Euros in 
20 years, amounts that cannot be directed to these destinations just from work incomes!) 
- participation to life insurances of the pension type addresses itself practically to a small part 
of population, the market for these types of insurances knowing its own developments are just 
loosely related to what happens within the old age insurance system. 
Pensioners of tomorrow remain, just as the ones of today, among the poorest Romanians 
(for at least yet another century quarter): 
 a) Pillar I even if operational for 4 years under the present construction has not delivered yet 
the expected results and serious “self-financing” problems are expected. 
b) Funded pensions, even already regulated are still not operational. No occupational scheme 
has been established (the estimate participation is 100 thousands/year), and the private funds 
                                                 
15 Revista Capital 19 august 2004.   20
shall be compulsory only for about 600 thousand persons in the first year, fact that diminished 
the interest of large insurance companies about the new market. 
 
4.2. Economic – social and demographic conditions – restrictions in applying the pensions' 
reform 
For a certain period of time, it was attempted to justify the inefficiency of the pension support 
and reform policy by the “inheritance” of severe inequities from the old system promoted by the 
communist regime. After 10 years of correction, adjustment, revigoration and preparation 
endeavours for switching to a modern system, based on several pillars, and after 4 years of 
(truncated) enforcement of the PAYG scheme in his new architecture we have reached the 
point of a new beginning (year 2005), when the intentions aim to resolve the ground issues – 
“reinstaurating equity within the system and its efficient operation” – and, finally, 
supplementing the system with occupational schemes and private funds. 
Comparing the “initial” moments from 1990 and 2001, in 2005 the economic-social 
conditions are, in our opinion, far worse because: 
a) ‘The external environment’ does not sustain pension system reform, revigoration and far 
more important its efficiency:  
o  The economic dependency ratio continues to deteriorate, currently an employee 
supporting 1.4 pensioners. From 1990 up to present through economic restructuring 
more than 4 million jobs were lost and the number of pensioners has increased to 
over 2 millions. 
o  The economic performances are still fragile, the economic ‘support basis’ for PAYG 
is insufficient (small wages, evasion, etc.). Although in the last 4 years GDP 
increased with about 5.5% per year, the average wage remains low – around 195 
Euros/month in 2004 and the underground economy represent about 25% from 
employment; in accordance with the Updated Economic Programme of EU-
preaccession, the growth pace of the actual wage shall be diminished, which means 
also reduced contributions for social funds, but also a decreased propensity for 
participation to funded pensions; 
o  The part-time and temporary employment gains more ground, and the proposals of 
altering the Labour Code (reintroduction of civil contracts, for which in the past no 
contribution was paid towards pension) shall narrow even more the sphere of 
potential contributors; 
o  Fiscal reform contributes much too less at stimulating the participation to the system, 
especially in the case of private pensions; for instance, the contribution to the 
pension system is deductible just for pillar I integrally and on a certain sum for 
occupational pensions, and probably within the limits of the compulsory 
contribution to private funds; 
o  The transfer rate and maximum contribution limit to PAYG assures far too modest 
benefits as against the necessities of decent living standard at old age. The net 
average pension for age limit and complete contribution stage in Dec2004 
represented 51% from the monthly nominal net salary earning; the pension point 
value of 39% from the estimated average wage in 2004 decreases to 32% in 2005. 
o  The indulgent attitude or of non-involvement against the improper enforcement of 
legislation regarding contributions’ collection (sanctions for companies or 
institutions are applied either selectively or not at all, and exemptions or   21
postponements have diminished significantly the incomes of the state social security 
budget). 
In addition, the restrictions  should not be omitted which have become pereneous  for the 
pension system reform in Romania (and not only) (V.Vasile 2001, 2004): 
o  Demographic ageing – fertility rate and life expectancy at birth. Romania cannot 
ensure generation replacement and the average life expectancy (among the lowest in 
Europe) is on slight increase; 
o  Young generation postpones entering on the real labour market due to extending the 
initial education period and/or to activities developed on the parallel labour market, 
so that the total contribution period is more reduced; 
o  ‘The dual’ payment system of labour, by declaring wages at the minimum level, 
especially in the private sector of the economy, and paying the remaining 
‘negotiated income level’ in cash, with no social contribution; it determines a 
reduced volume of contributions to the pensions fund; 
o  Weak attractivity of the pension system for those who are active but do not have the 
employee status (who can conclude facultative insurance contracts in PAYG), 
mainly due to the reduced efficiency of the system, estimated benefits being 
regarded as too small; 
o  The effective average age of retirement, at present around 52 years is relatively 
reduced. Its increase particularly based on the diminishment of the numbers of 
anticipated retirement and of sickness pensions for the 3
rd degree of invalidity shall 
lead to an extension of the contribution period within the system; 
o  As a complementary factor, but very important – the health state of the population 
measured by infant and general mortality, but also by the health state on age groups. 
It is also necessary to consider the health care system estimate efficiency - which 
nowadays does not ensure adequate curative and even less preventive assistance; 
o  Increasing the attractiveness for the domestic labour market for the young 
generation (in order to enter/return) far better trained professionally (but also with 
other expectations) and for those who temporary migrated to work abroad (and 
return with another labour culture); 
o  Globalisation of labour markets and participating to the single EU market (could) 
determine the decrease participation rate to the national pension system of the origin 
country. Labour force
16 migration and the perspective to become member-state of 
EU open the opportunity of choosing the most attractive pensions schemes from EU 
countries. Additionally, the increasing emigration of young persons stresses the 
structural ageing of population. 
b) – a sum of deficiencies is manifest in the pension system: 
* Constructive, financing, etc. 
 #  Insufficient sources for financing pillar I, and even less for the determined transfers to 
private pensions; 
 # Erosion of benefits from pensions due to the continuous inflation, increasing the 
proportions of poverty among old age persons 
  # Inequities within the system are still maintained 
                                                 
16 For details, see PAIS II, Study No. 5, IER, 2004, Bucharest   22
  # lack of attractiveness for participating to the system for future beneficiaries, as well as 
for market operators, the attractiveness rate of the system and the efficiency rate of 
benefits being “non-incentivising” (including, or maybe especially for private funded 
pensions). 
* Of image and transparency: 
  # Weak information of potential contributors about the advantages of the 
proposed/implemented system 
  # Transparency lack in underscoring (properly and completely) the results/effects of the 
reform measures. 
 
4.3. Third age welfare of present contributors to the system. Intergeneration solidarity 
versus personal responsibility 
 
4.3.1 Is the future social security system of elderly in Romania able to ensure “old age 
safety”? 
As target and major challenge for the architects of the pension system, the functioning and 
especially the social efficiency are hard to achieve. There is, and (at least) on average term there 
shall be maintained a range of factors – restrictions the impact of which cannot be 
attenuated/cancelled only by adjustments of the social protection system at old age, but by 
complementary measures and policies on the labour market, on the educational market, in 
the system of elderly assistance, of health care and of demographic policy, etc. 
Among the most significant factors for Romania, we remind: 
-  Economic growth – real and sustainable based on promoting competence, 
performance and competitiveness; 
- attracting and maintaining on labour market a qualified and (financially and 
professionally) motivated labour force. Free movement of labour and developed 
countries policies to cover own deficits of human resources with immigrants
17 remain a 
factor of diminishing the labour force supply on the national labour market. 
- The need to be also employed for the elderly population increases considerably, but 
efficiency remains low. In Romania the elderly population is forced to add to pension 
incomes by temporary (re)employment
18. With only few exceptions, the jobs (usually 
part-time) for them are under their professional training level or work experiences and 
incomes are more reduced. There is also the possibility of continuing the activity after 
retirement age, even if the contribution stage is complete, or higher, but of this facility 
may benefit just some categories of employees (with high professional training, or with 
expertise that is lacking on the labour market) and just if the employer agrees to it. 
                                                 
17 Even if the Lisbon target of 70% employment is achieved by 2010 and maintained thereafter (which is less 
probable – author’s note), the Commission predicted that the number of employed people within the EU will 
actually fall by 20 million between 2010 and 2030. The prospects for economic growth – the result of the 
combined impact of employment and productivity growth – are worrying. While no one suggests that immigration 
provides the complete solution, sustained flows of labour migration are needed to compensate for an ageing 
population. Several Member States have re-opened channels for economic migration and economists highlight the 
role immigrants can play in matching labour demand and supply. (Managing migration in a global economy. 
Migrants can contribute to meet Europe’s challenges, Social Agenda, the European Commission’s magazine on 
employment and social affairs, issue no. 10, December 2004, p. 18). 
18 Legal regulation allows that pensioners develop activities and receive wages – save for those retired on health 
grounds or who are under the legal retirement age and benefit of anticipated pension.   23
 
Box 2                                            Self-supporting capacity of the pension system 
 
Pension system self-financing is difficult to be balanced without transfers from state budget, among others, 
because: 
-The 15 years and over employment rate is reduced, 51% in 2003 and decreasing; 
-The employees share in total employment remains low, 62% in 2003; 
-Labour incomes cannot sustain a decent living standard. It remains modest, much lower than in other 
CEEC countries, and revised PEP stipulate a slowdown increasing trend of wages in 2006-2007; 
-Old age employment rate (55-64 years) was 38.1% in 2003 and the one of the 65 years and over 
represented around 18%.  
All these lower performances (in comparison with the Lisbon Agenda) with a significant impact on pension system 
financing request a deeply (re)consideration of the pension system sustainability and perspectives.  
Source: AMIGO Survey 
 
4.3.2. New adjustments are necessary 
Demographic evolutions, population mobility and financial problems of the political system 
determine a permanent reform of the old age insurance system. 
An active person developing activities in various geographical spaces has as principle the right 
to be insured, using in the case of pensions the scheme which seems best suited to the personal 
situation. This implies for the Romanian pension system as a whole a rethinking of its 
architecture so as to become attractive for future beneficiaries, and at the same time be able 
to support current pensioners who are entitled to such benefits. A special attention is 
necessary for pillar I constructive scheme. It is simultaneously an issue for the calculation 
algorithm and participation conditions, but also a financing one, mainly in the case of 
temporary imbalance which at present is insured by the state budget or other funds collected 
through other channels also from the population. 
 
Box 3                             Intergenerational solidarity – another approach 
 
The intergenerational “contract” of redistribution was rationalised by granting benefits depending on the 
contributions paid during the entire active life.  
The intergenerational solidarity is debated on moral and reasoning grounds.  
The social policy is opposed to the economic competitiveness exigencies and the first “casualty”... is the public 
pension system, due to the high level of compulsory social contributions. Employers’ associations explain the 
volume of the black labour market as due to these excessive social contributions. 
Source: E. Dumitru, Sistemul de pensii în România, încotro? [Romanian Pension System, Whereto ?], The Society 
for social-democratic debates, Foundation Friedrich Ebert, 17.02.2005, Bucharest 
Another aspect that should not be ignored is represented by the presence of active population 
(only or in parallel) on the informal economy, mainly due to the favourable economic 
environment. Usually, these persons do not participate in any way (or only at minimum limit) to 
the pension system. These won’t have incomes such as pensions on retirement age, or their 
pensions will be insufficient. The social burden shall be transferred on the social assistance 
system which is unlikely to be sufficiently consolidated in Romania as to solve such problems, 
as well. The question arises, under these circumstances, whether special measures are not 
necessary for those who today, for various reasons do not participate to pension system to 
such an extent as to have insured a minimum replacement income required for a decent living in 
the 21
st century. The current legal regulations seem to knowingly omit such situations that 
won’t disappear, but right on the contrary shall amplify.  
Irrespective how many estimates we would do, the picture of benefits at the retirement age of 
today’s young people has a single positive variable and a number of restrictions:   24
-  Significant participation to the system is the only chance for being able to 
anticipate a decent pension at old age. This means pillar I (compulsory by law 
for employees) and in addition, and mainly, contributions to the private funds; 
-  the participation restrictions are multiple, among the most important now, 
and for a significant period in the future there must be considered: 
a)  incomes remain relatively low in a society in which prices are (shall be until 
2007) comparable to those in developed European states having labour 
incomes several times higher; 
b)  insurances for work delivered abroad represent more something desirable 
than a reality; 
c)  Even if the participation to funded pillars is desired, the shorter contribution 
period and/or relatively low possible contributions determine a diminished 
efficiency of personal accounts. 
Not long time ago a Romanian saying “who does not have grandparents/elders should buy 
some” could be understood also under the form of support, including the financial one, ensured 
by the elderly from their pension, for young families. Currently, more and more old persons 
are financially supported by the younger members of the family because their pension is not 
even enough to pay minimum services for household. The promised recalculation does not 
solve the issue of financial independence of old persons with small pensions, and the state is 
incapable to ensure the specific social assistance required for third age persons. In addition, 
charity actions and the NGOs activity is (still) at the beginning and covers only partially and 
insufficiently the needs of elderly. The current situation of pensioners might be regarded as 
similar as or even far better than the one of future pensioners, who are today’s contributors. 
The spectre of poverty in old age for those active today, starting from the current structure of 
the pension system (even under its revised form and completed with private funds) seems as 
inevitable. The prevention of such a situation implies, next to the contribution, also capitalised 
funds and the long-term re-balances of pillar I (including the development of a PAYG system 
subcomponent that should allow a minimum pension to cover the basic needs of the population). 
If we take into account the minimum insurance ceiling provided by Act 19/2000 it may be 
considered that the legislation envisaged such a situation but the quota of ¼ from the average 
wage (3/4 from the national minimum wage) is merely symbolic, the resulting pension being 
insufficient even for covering the absolute poverty line (!) 
 
5. A coherent strategy of old age insurance 
 
The social security systems remain important for the Romanian society of today and tomorrow. 
At their core shall be placed the pension insurance. If for today’s pensioners the 
redistributive system remains the single solution, for future pensioners a single viable 
direction may be outlined, the orientation towards a combined pension, in which the 
contributively component determined by personal responsibility shall be predominant. 
 
5.1. Towards an efficient pension system. Requirements for a sustainable strategy 
Starting from Romania’s firm orientation towards accession and considering the targets 
established for the field at EU level in Lisbon (2000), Santa Maria da Feira, etc., the reform 
measures naturally nuanced in accordance with the domestic specific must be subordinated to 
the general goal of long-term sustainability of the system, meaning their ability to meet   25
social objectives on an ongoing basis while maintaining other important policy goals, such as 
sound public finances and intergenerational equity. 
This means, at the same time: 
* High rates of economic growth and macroeconomic policies that should support social 
reforms; 
* increasing employment and retaining/keeping the young people on the domestic labour 
market (provision on better employment incentives), as support for extending the 
contributors basis to the PAYG system; 
* increasing labour productivity; an integrated policy of technology driven productivity 
growth, better jobs and greater social cohesion; 
* ensuring the gain of incomes from labour that would allow for the participation to private 
insurance systems and to occupational schemes; 
A coherent and adequate strategy must be based as well on intra- and intergenerational 
consensus, on involvement and commitment of relevant stakeholders as on ensuring confidence 
and broad acceptance of the system reform. 
In Romania a series of adjustments are necessary, focused on: 
¾  Stimulating participation as well to the public system as to the private funded pillars; 
¾  Rebuilding pillar I for assuring the viability of the system in the future. On one hand 
this is about introducing elements as funded schemes, and on the other, about   
“cleaning” the system of non-contributively services; 
¾  A control of administrative expenditures, increasing the efficiency of funds 
management; diminishing fiscal evasion; 
¾  Avoid the premature exit of the older workers from the labour market by providing 
stronger employment opportunities for them and restricting early retirement 
¾  Introducing without further delays private funded systems and stimulating participation, 
inclusively by higher/total fiscal deductions; 
¾  Strengthen public confidence in the pension system and diminishing the differences 
against similar systems from other countries in order to limit transfers over the border
19. 
¾  Periodically, depending on the demographic situation and of the labour market it is 
necessary to modernise/adjust the pension system and labour market policies so as to be 
mutually supportive and more conducive to the promotion of economic growth and 
social cohesion. 
 
Box 4          A priority of the present Government (Tariceanu, of democrat-liberal orientation) 
- improving the life standard for elderly 
Main objectives of the reform: 
-financial enhancement of the public pension system and ensuring adequate incomes for pensioners within the 
system; 
-reconstruction of pillar I by “cleaning” it, among other measures, of some types of non-contributively services
20; 
- Introducing new financing and administration alternatives for pensions of the funded – type, private management, 
which should ensure for future pensioners not only a certain income, but also a decent one. 
Source: GD 24/2004, Governance Programme 
                                                 
19  For Romania it represents currently only a potential factor but one that can be avoided/limited by the 
reconstruction of the system in itself. But just as true is that we might face delocation issues of some economic 
activities just because of the relation taxes/contributions and other public services in the public field (first of all, it 
is about the wage taxation, respectively the social burden, and secondly about the services efficiency).   26
 
5.2. Partnership in building and sustaining an efficient insurance system for old age 
The modernisation/reform of the pension system by its nature is a more and more complex 
process that implies various interests and actors. The life conditions of an increasingly larger 
part of the country’s population depend on the cooperation and convergence of their actions. It 
should not be forgotten that for each generation of beneficiaries (pensioners) or of 
contributors (employees) the (legitimate) expectancies must be respected and an equitable 
balance maintained between rights and duties. 
In addition, any reform and even more so a reform in the social field must sustain/transpose into 
practice the core objective of achieving its role as collective guarantees against poverty and 
social exclusion, based on commitment and political will. Much needs to be done to involve 
the social partners, NGOs, local governments, community groups and individual 
citizens.
21 
Partnership presupposes assuming responsibilities by all interested social actors for: 
-promoting affordable, high quality services, in particular for long term health care 




6. Brief conclusive considerations 
 
Financial independence at old age and the possibility of enjoying the advantages of the 
retirement status are (and unfortunately shall remain) realities just for a (very) small part 
of Romania’s population. A large part of the pensioners return on the labour market for 
supplementing their incomes, “forgetting” about leisure and travels, etc. Others who by nature 
of their profession or for medical reasons cannot round up their incomes by labour lead a life of 
unaccountable deprivations in order to survive. For many Romanians, to be a pensioner 
represents a new burden and for families to have a pensioner constitutes for certain additional 
costs, to a larger extent than an advantage (irrespective of its kind). Even if, according to 
official statistics the total population poverty rate has diminished from 35.9% in 2000 to 23% in 
2004 (estimates of the World Bank), with very few exceptions, the situation of pensioners did 
not improve, just on the contrary. 
 
It is more and more obvious that switching to the private pension system is the main solution 
for avoiding extreme poverty at retirement age. But this measure cannot solve the issue of life 
quality for the future third-age generation. The medium-term collapse of the current pension 
system in Romania can be avoided by coherent economic policy actions/measures aiming 
directly at the pension system and by complementary actions for sustaining –financing, 
operatively and efficiency - the whole old age insurance system. 
Among the most important we remind: 
- those with an overall character: 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 Sickness insurance, child nurturing indemnisation. 
21 Report of the High-Level Group on the future of social policy in an enlarged EU, Employment and social affairs, 
EC May, 2004.   27
•   promoting a pro-birth policy by active measures of supporting family and 
children 
•  Enhancing the quality  of the preventive health care system, increasing 
professionalism and responsibility. Reducing corruption and clientelism by 
actually promoting access equality to adequate and quality health services. 
•  Developing the employment national strategy based on new competitive 
jobs, on promoting competence and individual performance; 
•  Sustaining career development, encouraging entrepreneurship, public-
private partnership. 
- directly aimed at the pension system: 
a)  enlarging the contributors base by stimulating participation to optional 
systems, higher fiscal deductibility, supervision of funds operation, etc; 
b)  increasing the cashing performance of contributions, delaying instalments 
and enforcement for bad debtors; 
c)  promoting system equity by diminishing “exceptions” of any kind, which 
are unjustifiable according to objective criteria; 
d)  increasing the professionalism of employees responsible with funds 
administration and management; 
e)  finalising the data base and operationalising the relation fund-benefit; 
f)  information and transparency on funds’ activity, on their participation and 
functional efficiency; 
g)  increasing system equity by differentiated indexation of pensions for 
gradually eliminating the group of favoured pensioners on pensions’ 
calculation whose pension, by recalculation shall not be corrected by 
diminishing it; 
h)  granting special aid for the oldest pensioners whose recalculated pension 
quota is below the threshold of extreme poverty – from the state social 
insurance funds and from other funds (facilities regarding health assistance, 
assistance from local budgets for the payment of utilities, their integration in 
the beneficiaries’ system of charity organisations, etc.). 
   28
 




Comprising sphere in the 
system/contribution 





Corporations’ employees  a) payments in equal shares: 
employee, employer, state 
b) minimum 23 years 




Urbane active population     
Act 10/1949 
(1949-1977) 
Employees and assimilated 
categories (exclusively) 
a) employers 
b) 25 years men, 20 years 
women 
d) 50-80% from wage 
e) average gross monthly 
income for the last 12 month 
with ceiling at a certain amount
Act from 1977 
(1977-1989) 
Employees and assimilated 
categories, APC members, 
individual, non-
cooperativised farmers 
a) 14% from the wages fund 
for the employer, 2% (from 
1986, 3%) from the 
employees; for farmers, 8% 
from the global production 
value paid by APC 
b) the stage increased with 5 
years (30 years men, and 25 
years women) 
c) 62 (60 on request) years 
men, and 57 (55) years 
women for employees and 
65 years men, and 60 years 
women for farmers 
d) 50-80% of wages 
e) the average monthly gross 
income in 5 consecutive years 
for the last 10 years, period 
elected by the future pensioner 
Notes: a) contributions; b) contribution period; c) age limit; d) pension quota; e) computation basis. 
Source: based on the legal provisions 
 
Annex 2                                        Main characteristics of the system 
 
 PAYG  Occupational  schemes  Private pension funds  Life  insurance  of 
the funded pensions 
type
22 




Employees of companies 
without debts to the state 
Compulsory for persons 
entered for the first time 
in the system and under 
35 years of age; 
Optional for persons 
Individually insured 
                                                 
22 Act 403/2004 transposes the EU directives provided for the insurance field and stipulates the range of life 
insurances applicable as of the date of EU accession. Among these are considered: the due term survival insurance, 
the insurance with annuities payment connected to the investment funds.   29







defined (for 2005, 
31.5% from the 
wage bill from 
which 9.5% is the 
contribution of the 
employee).  
The life annuity is 
determined on the 
basis of the average 
number of points 
and the value of the 
pension point. 
24 
Defined contributions (set 




Benefits defined by the life 
occupational schemes 
The amount due cannot be 





(2% from the wage bill 
in the first year with 
increases of 0.5% /year 
up to 6%). 
The due amount cannot 







accounts which on 
contract maturity – 
the retirement age – 
change into capital 
that might be 
integrally accessed, 







 -on  fulfilling  the 
legal retirement age 
- if the contribution 
was for minimum 15 
years – complete 
stage of contribution 
35 (30) years men, 
20 (25) years women 
 
-On request 
  - on fulfilling the legal 
retirement age 
- if the contribution was of 
minimum 60 months 
- personal assets are at 
least equal to the necessary 
amount for obtaining the 
minimum pension 
provided for in the norms 
of the Commission 
-On request 
-on fulfilling the legal 
retirement age 
- the net personal assets 
are at least equal to the 
necessary sum for 
obtaining the pension 
 





  A fund must have at least 
100 participants 
A fund
28 must have at 



















Authorised administrator (company on shares)
 29 Company  on  shares 
and/or authorised 
mutual company 
                                                                                                                                                             
23 Both categories of persons must be already insured and contribute to the public pension system; it is prohibited 
to simultaneously participate at several private pension funds. The transfer from one pension fund to another is 
allowed, but withdrawal is not accepted before fulfilling the legal retirement age. 
24 The average number of points is determined on the basis of the contribution period and paid contribution; the 
value of the pension point is annually determined by means of the state social insurance budget and represents 30 -
50% from the calculated average gross wage used in drawing up the budget. Participation to the occupational 
scheme depends on labour place, and the change of the job implies entering into another occupational scheme. The 
transfer of accumulated funds is not allowed from one scheme to another, the benefits being paid upon retirement. 
25  The optional occupational schemes must contain the quota and periodicity of contributions, the manner of 
distributing them between employee and employer, the investment rules for assets as well as the methods for 
effecting the payment of occupational pensions, frequency, duration an updating these payments. 
26 Adjusted by the CPI before the payment of the respective contribution, and the date of withdrawal and transfer 
of available to the account of the participant, that is diminished with the provisions perceived by the administrator 
and increased with a minimum real annual profit, determined by the commission that cannot be less than 1%. 
27 The value of paid contributions is adjusted with the CPI between the payment date of the respective contribution 
and the retirement date, of available transfer, and of their accessories diminished with transfer penalties and legal 
taxes. 
28  The pension fund is constituted by public company agreement concluded between minimum 100 founding 




Reserve fund up to 
3% from the SSF 
incomes, but more 
than the level of 
expenditures 
provided for the 
respective budgetary 
year 
- transfers from the 
state budget for 
balancing the fund 
Due diligence reserve 
fund.  
Guarantee fund for 
occupational pensions 
build from the 
contributions of the 
administrators and the 
incomes resulting from 
investing these sums in 
bank deposits and 
securities. 
Reserve fund created 
in accordance with the 
norms drawn up by the 
Commission. 
Guarantee fund built 
up from contributions 
of the administrators, 
and incomes resulting 
from investing these 
sums in bank deposits 
and securities.  
Compulsory  safety 




maintains  technical 
reserves, including 
mathematical for the 




State  guarantee  Not guaranteed by the 
state and the funds can 




during the transfer of 
the sums to other funds 
The pension fund 
cannot be declared as 




appointed by the 
Appeal Court 
Bucharest 
Judicial wind up 
based on the 
decision of the Court
Assets representing 
the life insurance 
fund are used only 
for paying debts to 
the insured. 
Source: legal provisions 
 
 
Annex 3                      
Organisation and functioning principles of the pension system 
 




uniqueness  (the state organises and guarantees for the public system based on 
the same legal norms) 
X    
equality (ensures for all participants, contributors and beneficiaries a non-
discriminatory treatment as regards the rights and duties provided by law) 
X X  X 
social solidarity (participants to the system assume mutually duties and benefit 
of rights for preventing, limiting or eliminating social risks provided by law) 
X X  X 
compulsiveness (natural or legal persons have, in accordance with the law the 
duty to participate to the system, the rights of social insurance being exercised in 
correlation with the fulfilment of duties) 
X   X 
(partial) 
contribution (the social insurance funds are constituted based on the owned 
contributions, the benefits being due on grounds of paid contributions) 
X X  X 
repartition (the achieved funds are redistributed for payment of dues to the 
public system, in accordance with the law) 
X    
Autonomy in administration   X  X  X 
Source: specific legislation Act 19/2000, updated, Act 411/2004, Act 249/2004, Act 32/2000 updated.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
29 The administrator (company on shares) has as exclusive activity object the management of the pension funds, the 
calculation and payment of the private pension rights. It can manage a single private pension fund and as many 
other occupational schemes.   31
Annex 4 
 Pensioners’ distribution on pensions' levels  
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-after 2 years of enforcing Act 19, of quarterly indexation (differentiated) and of pension re-correlation 














































































































































































































































































































































9 2002 1691184=average pension






-  For 2004, after yet two years of indexation, additional re-correlation and before recalculation of pensions 
(data shall be available in the second quarter 2005) 
Source: based on NIS data 
 
Annex 5 
Households’ distribution and distribution of pensioners within households  




































































2000-gospodarii de pensionari 2000-persoane
2002-gospodarii de pensionari 2002-persoane
 
Source: NIS data 
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